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o p JURISDICTION

CTATBMENT

The Petition for Review MI impinrillv filnll nil f h r I 111 ill Sup- - '

'

issued a Writ of Review under Supreme Court No. 920181. Pursuant

>. 5

ransrerred the case to i> <
• ,HS has jurisdiction pursuant ?* ^

^*

7

•-

'
/0 -^-

- : -vi---i-

8-2a-3t2V^ * as amended.

1. Whether tli TH\ I oininissioii riiiiiinin.sh innlicil Male sliilutes and regui^i. ns
in imposing a sales 11\ on petitioner, as subcontractoi , for school construction materials
imu'hiist'd ilnni il) |„.| the schi

.

-

-

tax-exempt entity.

Standard of Review: Coiiccuuii oi en•

&I**rt »/i Uuomatu mi , in

iuJi ^

Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814 l\M SHI 585-89 (Utah 1991)"
-1"1 In lllici (In I'ii\ t, nniiiussinn t Minn nusly applied Mate statutes and regulations
in alternatively imposing a use tax on petitioner, as subcontractor, iui &e
maieiials purchased in Ulali directly by the school district a^ a tax-exempt t •
Standard of Review: Corn-Num nl n u n
1

Wlu iher fht Tax Cominh

If nnu h\ filiation}* , 'HI , \aprn,

i violated Utah statutes or the Utah Constitution

by imposing an r u n (mil \\w inii r n i • "iriii mi nisiiiii, ii (ax-exempt entity.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Mot ion Internationa1

1

hi,

if,

" SS5.

1 his action was commenced in the 'Tax Commission prior to January 1, IMN* jw- c.:. t . ..„ .»u.tier standard of review in effect prior to the Administrative Procedure Act applies in mis u^<. L' C A §
63-46b-22. The correction-of-error standard applies here because the issues on appeal cona-n >ia--utor\ a; J
contract interpretation that the court is as well-suited to determine as the agency.

GOVERNING LEGAL PROVISIONS
This case is governed by the following legal provisions, which are set out verbatim
in the Addendum (hereafter "Add."): U.CA. §§ 59-12-102, -103, and -104 of the Sales and
Use Tax Act (Add. 138); Utah Administrative Code §§ R865-19-42S, and -58S (Add. 149);
Utah Constitution Art. V, § 1; Art. VI, § 1; Art. X, §§ 1, 5; and Art. XIII, §§ 11, 12
(Add. 151).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this review proceeding, petitioner seeks a redetermination of the sales or use
tax deficiency assessed against it by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission. The tax deficiency was assessed against petitioner for building materials
that petitioner incorporated into the construction of a public school building. Petitioner
requested redetermination on the grounds that the materials in question were purchased
directly by the school district, not by petitioner, and that the transactions were therefore
exempt from any tax. (R. 292, Add. 30.) The parties conducted discovery, and the Tax
Commission held a formal evidentiary hearing on the issues on July 11, 1991. The
Commission thereafter entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Decision upholding the deficiency assessment. (R. 6, Add. 1.) Petitioner subsequently
filed a petition for review in the Utah Supreme Court, which issued a writ of review and
transferred the case to this Court. (R. 1.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1985, the Board of Education of Alpine School District ("Alpine"), a political
subdivision of the State of Utah and a tax-exempt entity under state law, determined to

-2-

• u n s ' i •! "

" Ji

i " "l|1

,

Il

T

'Lili t i-uiii'., known as Cedar Hollow

"T* '

School ("Project"). Alpine desired to purchase the major construction ma I r MM I
in: in 0 1 dei to benefit u . < ^ tax-exempt status and thereby reduce the cost of construction
to the public. Based
A1

wsultatinns i ."illi unl t In tn I i\/tu •, linin, (In" 'l.ix 'Jommissum,

- ^ e drafted the bidding instructions and construction contracts to provide for Alpine's
<rect purchase oi vi instruction materials.

Dr. Harold Jacklin, Alpine's Director of Physical

r

,,

Board of Education to supervise a11 phases of planning, financing, anc a str K-I .;. of
the --*v- -

Ending cooH"«

,K\

.**

n

trained architect and constrain* »i ^;per\isoi, ^%a^ employed f v Alpine 10 CISSIM i v
i

.iec* to f^s • a i ,s • '! r Jcrtd ; .aterials and

"in In h^uliii in ni -.site inspection: *
compliance with plans and specification/

T

" nnis Cer.»

.fc. the

contracting architect for the Project. (Stipulated Facts, R. 205,, Nos.. 3-6, 11-12, 25-33,
\ Inn III *P in i 111 ti mi's mi i .it i III irt j i , iiJiiii i
hereafter T r . , at w>-

l*- ^

A4o,

iudinig Transcript, July 11, 1991,

iiwiden Dep , in Record as Rxh P 7 K :! Hi )

v.f)iiie e r * e ^ into aii Agreement with Paulsen''hllsworth
i <• nonaction Cumpi^v ("Paulsen"^
} , i xh. R-l, Add :*

'

VHII

i ,' i ni i "< OIIIIJII/IIM ' III iiii< il iiifini

|K,

* addition u i ^ Agreements he "contract documents" governing

1

conditions ol \hv Contract for

(*» ^miction i k 134 , 0 1 " ); Supplemental General Conditions (sn P;ni I, M" o, H J I .
en
Exh. P-3, t\K

— '-ce Section 15D-Plumbing Specifications R 5U,
locument-

*. ^u^ing

Instructions to Bidders; and work change orders. (See Agreement, Article VI, Add. 58;
Stipulated Facts 4-11, Add. 40-42; Finding of Fact 3, Add. 2.)
The Agreement provided that Paulsen would be responsible for construction of
the Project, under the direction and supervision of Alpine (through Jacklin and Holden)
and the Project architect. (Add. 54-56, 59.) The Agreement required Paulsen to furnish
all materials for the Project, unless Alpine elected to modify that requirement through a
change order allowing Alpine to purchase the materials directly. (Stipulated Fact 12, Add.
42; Findings of Fact 3-4, 8, Add. 2-5.) The Agreement expressly accorded Alpine "the
right to furnish any part or all of the materials and equipment which shall become part
of the permanent structure." (Add. 59.)

Pursuant to this provision, Alpine was to

determine which of the needed materials it would purchase directly, send purchase orders
for those items directly to the suppliers, take title to the materials directly from the
suppliers, flwithout any vesting in the Contractor" (id.), and make payment for the
materials directly to the suppliers.

The contract price in the Agreement was to be

reduced by any amounts expended directly by Alpine for materials, as well as by the sales
tax that would have been paid had the materials been supplied by the Contractor. Upon
Alpine's exercise of the right of direct purchase of materials, the Contractor was relieved
from providing those same materials. The Contractor's only responsibility for directpurchased materials was to store them after delivery until incorporation into the building.
The direct purchase provisions essentially converted the Agreement from a traditional
"furnish and install" contract to an "install only" contract. The net effect of the Agreement
was that Alpine retained most of the administrative, supervisory, and purchasing functions
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of a traditional "general contractor" fAdd. 52, 59-62, 67-48, Tr. 25-2b> 74-76, 81, 95, 135H.

«l 'Villi, .MS, | 2

'

Contemporaneous with the Alpine-Paulsen Agreement, Paulsen entered into a
MihnuiiNHM A^ienm ni i wiiiii petitioner, Brown Plumbing & Heating Co. ("Brown"), for
Brown to perform the mechanical and plumbing work
incorporated all the terms of the prime contract doujments, discussed, above: .
" I he Contractor and the Subcontractor agree to be bound by the
terms of the prime contract agreement, construction regulations, general
conditions, plans and specifications, and any and all other contract
documents, if any there be, insofar as applicable to this subcontract
agreement, and to that portion of the work herein described, to be
performed by the Subcontractor. [Fxh. P-1, R 51, p I, Add 118.]

2

The Supplementary Conditions to the contract (Part J, paragraph 20) specifically reaffirmed Alpine's
right of direct purchase of materiak, with, the duty of storage following delivery on the Contractor::
20, DIRECT PURCHASES BY SCHOOL DISTRICT:
The Owner, at its sole option aid discretion, niay purchase certain major items and
quantities of materials from the specifications for utilization, in the project by writing
Purchase Orders directly to suppliers of said major items in the Contract. The General
Contractor and its subcontractors, when requested to do so by the Owner, shall make a
list of materials and their cost which materials can be purchased directly in said manner.
When approved by the Owner, the Owner may then provide purchase requisitions upon
which the Contractor will specifically state its needs and schedules for delivery dates. Such
Purchase Orders may then be written by the Owner from such requisitions. The Purchase
Order amount plus the sales tax amount will be deducted from the total Contract amount.
Invoices received upon receipt of delivery of material to the project site will be sent to the
• Owner for direct,, payment.
The Contractor shall, in all such cases hold the Owner harmless for any losses, claims,
defects, discrepancy, delays in delivery or other problems relating to such materials except
where any such, failure is attributable to the negligent acts of [sic] omissions by the Owner.
All risk of loss or damage to materials resulting from theft, vandalism or any other cause
whatsoever, shall be assumed by the Contractor from and after the delivery of any such
materials to the project site. [Exh. P-2, Add. 91, 96; see also Stipulated Fact 7, Add. 4041.]
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Accordingly, all the direct-purchase provisions in the prime contract documents applied
fully to the Subcontract, authorizing Alpine to purchase directly the mechanical and
plumbing materials to be installed by Brown.

Specifically, the "furnish and install"

requirements of the Subcontract and plumbing specifications (Section 15D-Plumbing, Exh.
P-3, R. 59, Add. 98) were modified by the direct-purchase provisions in the AlpinePaulsen Agreement and Part J, paragraph 20, of the Supplementary Conditions, cited
above. (Stipulated Facts 1, 7-8, 17-21, Add. 39-41, 45; Findings of Fact 6, 11-14, Add. 56; Tr. 18-20, 22-25, 155, 162, 170, 175.)3
Paulsen and Brown knew and understood, before construction began, that Alpine
intended to exercise its right of direct purchase of materials for the Project. Part J,
paragraph 20, of the Supplementary Conditions, authorizing direct purchases by Alpine,
was part of the specifications upon which Brown based its bid. Brown understood, at the
time of its bid, that it would not have to furnish or pay taxes on materials purchased
directly by Alpine, and that its only duty with regard to such materials would be to install
them. (Tr. 18-20.) At a preconstruction meeting with Paulsen, Brown and the other
subcontractors, Harold Jacklin and Dennis Cecchini specifically discussed and explained
the procedure for Alpine's direct purchase of materials set out in Part J, paragraph 20,
of the Supplementary Conditions. Jacklin and Cecchini made 'Very clear" that Alpine was

3

The original Subcontract, signed in June 1985, was superseded by the Subcontract included in the
Record as Exhibit P-l, dated February 20,1986. The two documents were identical, except that the contract
price in the second agreement was reduced by the actual amount of direct purchases (and related sales tax
savings) made by Alpine. (See notation at the top of the second agreement, Add. 118.) The purpose of
the second agreement was merely to conform the contract price with the actual amount due as a result of
the direct purchases. (Tr. 27-30, 55-56.) Mr Cecchini, the Project Architect, who had the responsibility
of interpreting the various contract documents, testified as an expert witness that signing the second
subcontract had the same effect as a change order for direct owner purchases. (Tr. 138-39, 157.)
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going to exercise the direct-purchase option, taking upon itself the responsibility for
purchase and delivery of the plumbing materials, leaving with Paulsen the duty to approve
and store the materials until installation by Brown. (Tr. 133-34, 141-44, 160.)
Throughout the construction period, Alpine maintained close supervision of the
Project. Harold Jacklin monitored all phases of the Project and remained ultimately
responsible to the Board of Education for satisfactory completion of the Project. He
authorized all direct purchases, purchase orders, and payments for materials. Mr. Jacklin
visited the Project site on at least a weekly basis and had authority to stop any part or all
of the Project if necessary. John Holden, working under Mr. Jacklin's direction, inspected
the Project almost daily, spending an average of 16 hours per week on the site. Holden
made weekly progress reports to Mr. Jacklin. (Tr. 69, 72-74, 81, 95, 117, 137-38; Holden
Dep. 11, 13-17; Stipulated Facts 25-33, Add. 46-47; Findings of Fact 9, 18-21, Add. 5-7.)
As provided in the contract documents and intended by the parties, Alpine directly
purchased the mechanical and plumbing materials for which Brown subsequently received
the tax notice under review. Alpine's general guideline to Paulsen and Brown was that
Alpine would consider for direct purchase any materials that would yield a sales tax saving
of $1,000 or more. Brown provided Paulsen a list of needed mechanical and plumbing
supplies that satisfied that guideline, along with the respective suppliers and prices as
contained in the original bid. Paulsen approved and passed that list on to Mr. Jacklin.
(One such list, typical of others, was introduced as Exhibit P-5, R. 80, Add. 122.) Mr.
Jacklin designated to Alpine's purchasing department specifically which items to purchase,
and the purchasing department sent purchase orders for those items directly to the
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suppliers. (Examples of Alpine purchase orders, typical of others, are included in Exhibit
P-4, R. 69 and 76, Add. 125, 132.) The suppliers delivered the materials to the Project
site, where they were inspected and approved by Mr. Holden and Paulsen or Brown, and
then stored on site by Paulsen until incorporation by Brown. Invoices for the materials
were sent by the suppliers directly to Alpine and approved for payment by Mr. Jacklin.
Alpine then sent payment directly to the suppliers. (Examples of invoices and Alpine
checks, typical of others, are included in Exhibit P-4, R. 70-75, 77-79, Add. 126-31, 13335.) Exhibit P-8 (R. 87-88, Add. 136) is an accounting of all direct mechanical and
plumbing purchases by Alpine, in the total amount of $465,110. Brown furnished only the
remaining materials not purchased directly by Alpine. (Tr. 20, 46-48, 63-64, 74-78, 8283, 86-88, 113-17, 123, 129, 155-56, 165-66; Stipulated Facts 21-23, 33, 36, 38, Add. 4548; Findings of Fact 13-16, 21, 24, Add. 6-8.)
As evidenced by the foregoing procedures, all parties concerned regarded Brown's
Subcontract as an "install only" contract with regard to the materials purchased directly by
Alpine. Lee Brown, President of Brown Plumbing, testified that Alpine's direct purchase
of the major plumbing materials relieved Brown of any duty to furnish, or to pay any tax
on, those same materials; that Brown was not involved in the purchase or delivery of the
direct-purchased materials, for which the challenged tax has been imposed; that Brown's
only contractual duty with regard to those materials was to install them; and that any sales
or use tax imposed on Brown for those materials will be passed on to Alpine. (Tr. 1920, 23-24, 26-27, 31, 34, 56, 61.) Leon Lundquist, one of the plumbing-material suppliers,
testified that he dealt directly with Alpine in filling out its purchase orders; and that he

&

regarded Alpine as the purchaser and owner of the materials; accordingly, he charged no
sales tax on the direct purchases- (Tr. 97-99, 104-06; Exh. P-4, R. 72, 75, Add. 128, 131.)
Mr. Cecchini, the Project Architect, testified as an expert witness that Alpine's exercise of
the direct-purchase provisions of the contract documents rendered the Brown Subcontract
an "install only" contract, imposing no duty on Brown to purchase and deliver the
materials purchased by Alpine. (Tr. 138-39, 144, 154-55, 160, 175.)
The material incidents and burdens of ownership of the direct-purchased items fell
on Alpine, not Brown. Most significantly, it was Alpine, not Brown, that actually paid for
the materials in question. (Tr. 26-27, 115-17; Findings of Fact 4e, 4n, 4p, and 24, Add.
2, 4, 8.) Alpine assumed the risk of any price increases that occurred between the time
of the original bid and actual purchase. (Tr. 31-32, 120-21, 155.) Alpine also assumed
the burden of correcting any variances in quantity of materials shipped. (Tr. 121-22.) If
any of the materials were defective or damaged in transit, Alpine corrected the problem
with the supplier directly, as any warranty on the items ran to Alpine as owner. (Tr. 80,
92, 143; Stipulated Fact 24, Add. 45-46; Finding of Fact 17, Add. 6.) Title to the directpurchased materials passed directly from the supplier to Alpine, without any vesting in
Brown.

(Stipulated Fact 16, Add. 44-45; Findings of Fact 4j and 10, Add. 3, 5-6.)

Responsibility for inspection and approval of the materials after delivery to the Project site
rested upon Alpine as owner and Paulsen as Contractor, although Brown also approved
the materials as an accommodation to Paulsen to ensure they could be installed according
to specifications. (Tr. 48-49, 74-75, 77, 87-88, 143; Findings of Fact 4m and 4n, Add. 4.)
Paulsen, as Contractor, was responsible for storage of the materials, and for any damage
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to the materials not caused by Alpine or Brown, prior to incorporation into the Project;
Brown had no such responsibility, unless Brown's own employees caused the damage. (Tr.
32, 41, 56, 143; Stipulated Fact 35, Add. 48; Findings of Fact 4h, 4k, 41, and 22, Add. 3,
7.) Alpine, through the State Risk Manager, provided fire and liability insurance on the
direct-purchased equipment and materials; whereas Brown carried only a general liability
policy that did not cover loss or damage to those materials. (Tr. 21, 118, 171; Stipulated
Fact 37, Add. 48; Finding of Fact 23, Add. 8.) All the direct-purchased equipment and
materials were incorporated into the Project; Brown retained none of them. (Stipulated
Fact 23, Add. 45; Finding of Fact 16, Add. 6.) Finally, if the challenged tax is imposed
on the direct-purchased materials, Alpine, not Brown, will pay the tax. (Tr. 34, 122;
Finding of Fact 4p, Add. 4.)
Notwithstanding the contract provisions and facts showing Alpine to be the
purchaser and owner of the major plumbing materials incorporated into the school Project,
on March 12, 1987 the Utah State Tax Commission served Brown with a Statutory Notice
of Deficiency assessing tax and interest on the direct-purchased materials in the amount
of $30,508.83.

(R. 234, Add. 26.)

The first paragraph of the Notice refers to the

assessment as a "sales tax deficiency," while the attached exhibit is labeled "SALES AND
USE TAX ASSESSMENT." (Add. 26, 28.) Brown filed a Petition for Redetermination,
explaining that the materials in question were purchased and owned by Alpine, and that
Brown merely incorporated the materials into the Project as an independent subcontractor.
(R. 292, Add. 30.) The Tax Commission's Answer alleges that Brown is liable for the
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tax because Brown was obligated by its Subcontract "to furnish all labor and materials,"
whether or not Brown actually purchased the materials. (R. 287-89, Add. 36-38.)
Following discovery, the Tax Commission conducted a formal evidentiary hearing
on the issues on July 11, 1991. Brown presented evidence, as documented above, that
Alpine purchased and owned the materials, that Brown's only role was to incorporate
those materials into the Project, and that the sales were therefore tax-exempt. Tax
Commission auditors testified that the assessment was based solely on the assumption that
the Subcontract was a "furnish and install" contract, without regard to Alpine's direct
purchase of the materials, thereby making Brown the "consumer" of the materials. (Tr.
190, 195-96, 198-201.)
The Tax Commission upheld imposition of the tax. The Commission found that,
while Alpine ordered, paid for, insured, and took title to the plumbing materials (Findings
of Fact 4, 10, 17, 23-24, Add. 2-6, 8), Brown "had the burdens and benefits of ownership,
and possessed control and ownership of the materials" (Finding of Fact 34, Add. 10).
The Commission held that Brown is liable for the sales or use tax, even though it was not
the purchaser, because Brown "consumed" the materials by converting them into real
property.

(Conclusions of Law 3-6, 21, Add. 10-11, 19-20.) The Commission never

specified whether it was imposing a sales tax or a use tax, appearing to use the terms
synonymously or alternatively. (See Decision and Order p. 24, Add. 24.) The Commission
ruled that, in order for the sales to Alpine to be tax-exempt, Alpine must also be the
"consumer" of the materials by acting as the "prime contractor" of the construction project.
(Conclusions of Law 10, 13-20, Add. 12-19.) The Commission concluded that the fact the
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tax would actually be paid by Alpine, a tax-exempt entity, had no legal significance.
(Conclusion of Law 11, Add. 13.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sales of tangible personal property to state entities, such as Alpine, are exempt
from sales and use taxes pursuant to 59-12-104(2) and Rule R865-19-42S, promulgated
thereunder. Accordingly, Alpine's direct purchases of the school construction materials at
issue in this case are not subject to taxation. The Tax Commission's assessment of a
"sales and use tax" on Brown, solely on the basis that Brown installed the materials as a
subcontractor, is contrary to Utah law and must be reversed.
The Commission cited no legal basis to justify imposing a sales tax on Brown.
Section 59-12-103(l)(a) authorizes a sales tax only on the "purchaser" of the property.
Alpine, not Brown, was the purchaser of the materials in question. Alpine ordered the
materials from suppliers, received invoices from the suppliers, paid the suppliers directly,
and received title to the materials directly from the suppliers. The Commission found that
Alpine, not Brown, was the purchaser. The cases cited by the Commission in support of
taxing the contractor as "consumer" of the materials are all distinguishable in the
important respect that in each case the contractor, not the government, was the
undisputed purchaser of the materials. The contractor-consumer rule has no application
to a contractor who is not the purchaser of the materials.
Rule R865-19-58S provides no authority for assessing Brown with the tax because
that rule, consistent with the statute, requires that the contractor be the purchaser and
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owner of the materials. Here, Brown was neither the purchaser nor the owner. The
Commission's decision violates the terms and intent of its own rule.
The Commission's conditions that, in order for a sale to be tax-exempt, the exempt
entity install the materials either with its own employees, through an "install only" contract,
or by acting as prime contractor, are unauthorized by statute and violate Rule R865-1942S. Accordingly, they cannot be imposed as a basis for the Commission's decision. In
any event, the conditions were satisfied in this case because Brown installed the materials
on an "install only" basis, and Alpine retained all the significant incidents of ownership of
the materials to qualify as "prime contractor" under the Commission's own analysis.
The Commission cited no legal basis to justify, alternatively, imposing a use tax on
Brown. Section 59-12-103(l)(l) and Rule R865-19-58S authorize a use tax only on the
"purchaser" of property purchased out-of-state for use or consumption in this state.
Alpine, not Brown, was the purchaser, and the property was purchased in Utah.
Moreover, Utah law prohibits imposing a use tax on property that is exempt from the
sales tax. Accordingly, the Commission's imposition of a use tax must be reversed.
Finally, the tax violates 59-12-104(2) because the burden of paying the tax falls on
Alpine, a tax-exempt entity. The tax violates the Utah Constitution by interfering with
the exclusive power of the Legislature to determine who is taxed and how tax revenues
will be appropriated.

Imposing a tax on public school construction materials also

unlawfully forces diversion of funds from education to noneducational purposes.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN IMPOSING A SALES TAX ON
BROWN, AS SUBCONTRACTOR, FOR SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION
MATERIALS PURCHASED DIRECTLY BY ALPINE AS A TAXEXEMPT ENTITY.

The Tax Commission recognized that sales to state entities, such as Alpine, are taxexempt under U.CA § 59-12-104(2). (Conclusion of Law 1, Add. 10.) However, the
Commission held that Brown is liable for sales tax on the plumbing materials in question
because Brown "consumed" those materials by installing them into the school building.
"That conversion of tangible personal property into real property is deemed to be the
consumption or use of the tangible personal property, which is the taxable event."
(Decision and Order p. 20, Add. 20.) Because it is the building contractor that typically
incorporates construction materials into a building, the Commission reasoned that "the
primary issue in this case is to determine whether [Brown] or [Alpine] was the real
property contractor." (Id. p. 21, Add. 21.) The Commission concluded, in somewhat
circular fashion, that because Brown converted the materials into real property, Brown was
the real property contractor and was therefore liable for the sales tax. (Id.) Respectfully,
the Commission's analysis is strained and misdirected in that it focuses entirely on the
identity of the "contractor" or "consumer" of the materials and overlooks the vital
threshold question of who was the purchaser of the materials.
A. No Statutory Basis For Sales Tax
Section 59-12-103(1), U.CA. sets forth the essential premise in our sales and use
tax scheme that the tax is imposed on the purchaser:
-14-

(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the
amount paid or charged for the following:
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within
the state;
• • ••

(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed
in this state. [Add. 142, emp. added.]
"Retail sale" is defined as any sale "to a user or consumer." 59-12-102(8)(a) (Add. 139).
"Sale" refers to transfer of title for a consideration. 59-12-102(10) (Add. 140). Thus, by
the express terms of the statute, sales tax is levied on the purchaser of the property. The
purchaser is the party that orders the property, pays the consideration, and receives title
to the property. See, e.g., Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (purchaser of
tangible goods is the person who orders and pays for them or is obligated to pay for
them). Yet, the Tax Commission focused only on the word "consumed" in subsection (1),
without reference to or consideration of the word "purchaser" in the prefatory language
to which that subsection pertains. (Decision and Order p. 20, Add. 20.) The Commission
made no finding that Brown purchased the materials for which the tax was imposed. In
fact, to the contrary, the Commission conceded that Alpine was the purchaser of the
materials. (Findings of Fact 4, 10, 15-16, 21, 24, Add. 2-8.)4

4

The only statutory references in the Tax Commission's decision are to 59-12-103 and -104.
(Conclusions of Law 1-2, Decision and Order p. 20, Add. 10, 20.) Section 59-12-103(l)(a) is the sales tax
provision; section 59-12-103(l)(l) is the use tax provision; and section 59-12-104(2) is the tax-exemption for
state entities. These sections were codified in their present form in 1987. Prior to 1987, the sales tax
provision appeared as 59-15-4(a); the use tax provision appeared as 59-16-3(a); and the state tax-exemption
appeared as 59-15-6(l)(a). (Add. 159; see Amendment Notes to sections 59-12-103 and -104 in 1987
Replacement Volume 6B, Add. 143, 147-48.) Because the sales at issue in this case occurred in 1985, it
would appear that the former tax provisions should apply. However, because there appears to be no
material change in the applicable provisions and definitions between 1985 and 1987, Brown does not
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The Tax Commission relied on three Utah cases for the proposition that a building
contractor may be assessed a sales tax on the basis that the contractor is the "consumer"
of the materials. (Conclusion of Law 4, Decision and Order pp. 20-21, Add. 10-11, 2021.) However, all three cases are distinguishable on the basis that in each case the
contractor was also the undisputed actual purchaser of the materials. For example, in
Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942),
the plaintiff taxpayer manufactured and sold concrete products to contractors for use in
state highway construction. The plaintiff argued that the sales to contractors were taxexempt because they were not "retail sales," as used in the taxing statute, and because the
contractors purchased the products as "instrumentalities of the state," a tax-exempt entity.
Id., 125 P.2d at 409-11. Relying upon the statutory definition of "retail sale," which
included sales to "a user or consumer," id. at 410, the Court concluded that the
contractors who purchased the products "are consumers within the meaning of our act
because they are the last persons in the chain to deal with such products before
incorporation into a separate entity."

Id. at 411.

The Court held that selling to

contractors on behalf of the state did not render the sales tax-exempt because the sales
were not directly to the state:
It is true that under this section [exempting sales to the state] sales made
directly by plaintiffs to the state would be exempt, but in the instant case the
sales are to an independent contractor and not to an agent of the state.
[Id., emp. added.]
As evidence that the contractors were the purchasers, the Court noted that "plaintiffs
. . . look solely to the contractors for their payment, and not to the state." Id.
challenge the Commission's reliance on the later version of the statutes.
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Similarly, in Olson Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361
P.2d 1112 (1961), the plaintiff taxpayer subcontracted to construct buildings for the federal
government. The subcontractor claimed that its purchases of construction materials should
be tax-exempt because the construction contracts provided that title to the materials would
vest in the government upon delivery to the construction site. The Court followed the
holding in Utah Concrete Products that "contractors, engaged in the construction of a public
project for a lump sum, were 'consumers'... of the materials purchased and used by them
in the performance of their contract." Id., 361 P.2d at 1113, emp. added. The Court held
that the title-shifting provision in the contracts did not alter the fact that the subcontractor
purchased the materials for the purpose of incorporating them into the buildings. Because
the subcontractor was both the purchaser and consumer, the sales were not tax-exempt.
Id.
In the third, and most recent, case relied upon by the Tax Commission, Tummurru
Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), the taxpayer sought
a tax-exemption for construction materials it purchased as contractor for use in out-ofstate projects. Again, the Court followed its holding in Utah Concrete Products that
"contractors were the ultimate consumers of the items they purchase for incorporation
into various forms of real estate." Id. at 718, emp. added. Because the contractor
purchased and took possession and title to the materials in Utah, the sales were not
exempt, even though the conversion to real property would occur out-of-state. Id. at 719.
Thus, the cases relied upon by the Tax Commission uniformly stand for the
unquestioned rule that a contractor who purchases and "consumes" building materials by
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converting them into real property is liable for the sales tax. But that rule has no
application to this case because Brown is not the purchaser of the materials for which the
tax is assessed; Alpine is the purchaser. Alpine ordered the materials, was contractually
obligated to pay for them, and did pay for them.
The Tax Commission is attempting to stretch the contractor-consumer rule to apply
to contractors who do not purchase the materials, but merely install them. However,
there is no support in Utah law for that position. The tax at issue is a "sales" tax, not a
"consumption" tax. To suppose that a sales tax may be imposed upon a contractor merely
for installing materials purchased by the real property owner defies both reason and law.
Under the Commission's decision, a contractor who is hired by a homeowner to install
roofing shingles purchased by the homeowner would be subject to a sales tax merely on
the theory that he "consumed" them by installing them. However, the taxable event is not,
as the Commission surmised, the "consumption" of the materials, but the sale of the
materials. The cases have applied a consumption analysis only to determine whether the
sale was a "retail sale," as defined in the law; that is, to determine whether the purchaser
is also the consumer, making the sale taxable to the purchaser. If the purchaser does not
"consume" the materials, but holds them for resale, the purchase is not taxable. The
Commission's rationale ignores the purchase and the purchaser and taxes the supposed
"consumer." However, in order for the contractor to be the consumer, he must first be
the purchaser. If the contractor is not the purchaser, then the consumption analysis does
not even apply. If, as here, the state is the purchaser of the materials, the sale is taxexempt, regardless of the contractor's role in converting them to real property, as the
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Court expressly acknowledged in Utah Concrete Products.
Nickerson Pump

125 P.2d ai 411. See also

Commission, 12 Utah 2d 30, 361 P.2d 520

(1961) (emplacement of pumps sold to government nontaxable); Briggs \ PagtH 21
l\ ii S M M

(App. Div. 1961) (contractor not liable for sales tax on construction

materials purchased directly by tax-exempt rntii> iiinl iibiiilli il In contractor).
In summary, the sales tax statute limits imposition of the tax to the purchaser of
fin1 items. pitTiiidmf! ino sales tax assessment on Brown.
B. No Regulatory Basis For Sales Tax
(lit

I.I> Commission repeatedly cited Rule R865-19-58S, Utah Administrative

Code, in suppnrl itf i "„ IOIICIUMOU * 11 c * i Hmwn n liabl'i lui llie tax as "consumer" of the
materials. (Conclusions of Law 3-9, 11, 20, Decision and Order p. 24, Ad<
19, 24.

J-13, 17-

However, the language of the Rule is contrary to the Commission's conclusion.

To the extent any part of that Rule may I»e uiriMiufri l

'.nppi ii (in < ommission's

decision, it is unauthorized and unenforceable as contrary to the statutes and cases
discussed ahuvt

b # i 4son t onsma turn t Vi i Sitae Fax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361

P.2d 1112, 1113 (1961) (administrative regulation contrary to statute is invalid).
] iilt R865-19-58S provides in relevant part:
A.

Sale of tangible personal property to real
property contractors and repairmen of real
property is generally subject to tax.

5

As with the applicable statutes, the Tax Commission relied upon the current version of the Rule,
R865-19-58S (Add. 150), rather than the version that existed in 1985, Tax Regulation A12-Q2-S58a (Add.
172). However, because the differences in wording between the two are minor, no objection is made.
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1.

The person who converts the personal property
into real property is the consumer of the personal
property since he is the last one to own it as
personal property.

2.

The contractor or repairman is the consumer of
tangible personal property used to improve, alter
or repair real property; regardless of the type of
contract entered into-whether it is a lump sum,
time and material, or a cost-plus contract.

3.

. . . [Sjales of materials and supplies to
contractors and subcontractors are taxable
transactions as sales to final consumers. This is
true whether the contract is performed for an
individual, a religious institution, or a
governmental instrumentality.

4.

Sales of materials to . . . government agencies
are exempt only if sold as tangible personal
property and the seller does not install the
material as an improvement to realty or use it to
repair real property. [Add. 150.]

Construed in its entirety, this Rule does not support taxing a contractor, merely
because he installed the building materials, unless the contractor is also the purchaser of
the materials. The prefatory language in part A. limits application of the Rule to a "sale"
of property "to real property contractors" meaning the contractor is the actual purchaser
of the property.

The subsequent numbered subparts are valid only if they assume

compliance with the purchase requirement in part A. Subpart A.1. provides that the
contractor is the "consumer" of the property only if "he is the last one to own it as
personal property." Since Brown never held title to the materials in question (Findings
of Fact 4j and 10, Add. 3, 5-6), Brown did not "own" them and cannot be considered
their "consumer." Subpart A.3. also limits taxability to "sales of materials and supplies to
-20-

contractors?

thereby excluding sales made directly to exempt real property owners, siicih

.is Alpine in ihi> liiv

Subpart A.4. also supports a tax-exemption in this case because

the sales were made to Alpine, and the "sellers" or suppliers
materials."

Ilii I in i "install ,he

ITiat leaves only subpart A.2., which, if construed consistent with the

surrounding subparts, would CUIMI piufwilv iTquu'f

ihr

MMI

1 onsumer" first be the

purchaser of the property. If read in isolation, subpart A.2., in imposing a tax on the
contractor "regardless of the type of contract," is simply invalid as contrary to the
controlling statutes and cases, discussed above, which y-

*

nlv if

the contract is the "furnish and install" variety.
in 1 in s 11111! 11 ni 1i f v 111 (.' n 1111111 ss 1 o 1T s 11 (" 11 ,s 1 (111 1 ,s contrary to its own rgulation. The sales
tax regulation relied upon by the Commission authorizes imposition of the tax on tlle
contractor only if he is also the purchaser

of the materials, precluding the assessment on

Brown in this case.
C. N o Other Legal Basis For Sales Tax
I i.tvjiijj'1 established 1 in,1111 the applicable statutes and regulations limit imposition of
a sales tax to the purchaser of the materials, the analysis now shifts to H discussion of
whether Alpine's purchases qualify for the exemption. The Tax Commission concluded
that sales to an exempt entity, such ..is Alpine, a n cwnupt lioin i;\\ hiil\ if the exempt
entity is also the "consumer" of the property, as determined by whether: (a) "the exempt
entit) has its own r mployec.s attatti the materials and/or supplies to the realty"; or (b)
"the exempt entity separately hires a contractor to attach the materials and/or supplies 10
the realty on a labor only or install only contract"; or (c) the exempt entity "acts as the
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prime contractor by converting the tangible personal property to real property."
(Conclusion of Law 13, Add. 13-14.) However, the Commission cites no authority for
imposing these conditions on exempt entities in order to claim their rightful exemption.
As noted above, section 59-12-104(2) unconditionally exempts sales to the state and
its political subdivisions. The statute imposes no requirement that the exempt entity also
be the "consumer" of the materials or "contractor" for installation of the materials. The
Tax Commission is apparently confusing the unconditional tax-exemption in 59-12-104(2)
with the conditions for a sales tax on non-exempt entities under 59-12-103(1). However,
the two statutes operate independently of each other. If a sale is to an exempt entity,
there can be no tax, regardless of whether the sale could be taxed if it were to a nonexempt entity.

If a sale is to a state entity, that should end the inquiry, as plainly

affirmed in Rule R865-19-42S, Utah Administrative Code:
A. Sales made to the state of Utah,... or to its political subdivisions
such as . . . school districts, . . . are exempt from tax if such property [sic]
for use in the exercise of an essential governmental function. If the sale is
paid for by a warrant drawn upon the state treasurer or the official
disbursing agent of any political subdivision, the sale is considered as being
made to the state of Utah or its political subdivisions and exempt from tax.
[Add. 149.]
While 59-12-104(2) imposes no requirement that the property be used "in the exercise of
an essential governmental function," there is no suggestion in this case that that
requirement was not satisfied. Moreover, there is no question that the purchases were
made by Alpine's "official disbursing agent." (Finding 21, Add. 7.)

Accordingly, the

purchases by Alpine are tax-exempt without regard to the Tax Commission's artificial and
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unauthorized conditions. In any event, the Commission's condition (b) above, was plainly
satisfied in this case, and condition (c| nwy Nij viiiiMiifci u \\\v aliniwti^e.
The Commission's condition (b) was satisfied because Alpine did hire a contractor
inn attach tin iiiiMin'iJiI11. iin iin "install only11 contract The Commission's auditors testified
that they assessed the deficiency against Brown only because they believed that the
Subcontract was a "furnish and install" contract, requiring Brown to purchase the plumbing
materials. (Tr. 190, 196, 199.) They wrrr uiiiiwair uf Alpmr's dntet supervision of the
Project,

Alpine's direct purchases of plumbing materials, and the reduction in the

Subcontract in idloM, I hose purchases; they did not consider such involvement to be
relevant.

(Tr. 198-201.)

Accordingly, the deficiency assessment w.is bused on a

misunderstanding of the terms and operation of the Subcontract.
The Tax Commission itself misicinl oi misuiuli nlood the direct-purchase provisions
in the contract documents, leading the Commission to the erroneous conclusion that
Brown remained obligated to furnish the materials purchased by Alpine. For example, in
Findings 4s, 25, and 28, the Commission refers in Mimiiiet lanyungc st.il my th.ii the directpurchase provisions do not relieve Paulsen or Brown from their duty to furnish materials.
(See Add. 61, *)N, 101. | The Commission iiitsiviiistrued that language to mean that Brown
remained obligated to furnish plumbing materials even after those same materials were
purchased directly by Alpine. (See Decision and Order p. 23, Add. 23.) However, that
interpretation is contrary to the contract laiipiagr,, tht uitcul ,,i1 the parties, iind reason.
The contract language relied upon by the Commission merely meant that the unexecuted
direct-purchase provisions hv themselves did not relieve Paulsen or Brown from their

.?J

"furnish" requirements, because Alpine could still choose not to exercise the directpurchase option. However, once Alpine actually exercised the direct-purchase option and
purchased the plumbing materials, obviously Brown was relieved from any duty to furnish
those same materials. As to those direct-purchased materials, the Subcontract was an
install only contract. (Tr. 19, 23, 61, 114, 160, 173, 175.)
The Commission's conclusion that Brown remained obligated to furnish the same
materials already purchased by Alpine is also contrary to the Commission's other findings
that: Brown's "furnish and install" obligation was "subject to provisions for change orders"
(Finding 6, Add. 5); Alpine "could amend the contract by change order and also subtract
a contract sum from the total contract it so desired" (Finding 8, Add. 5); "[t]he contracting
documents provided for change orders" (Finding 13, Add. 6); and "[c]hange orders were
made to the subcontract for materials directly purchased by the [Owner]" (Finding 14,
Add. 6). If the Subcontract was amended by change orders for Alpine's direct purchase
of materials, as the Commission expressly found, then the Subcontract provisions requiring
Brown to furnish those same materials were plainly superseded and rendered void.
Accordingly, Brown was hired on an "install only" basis as to the materials purchased by
Alpine, and the Commission's condition (b) for tax-exemption applies6
Regarding imposed condition (c), whether Alpine was acting as "prime contractor"
on the Project, the Tax Commission ruled that Alpine's involvement "did not rise to the
level of the real property contractor because [Alpine] did not assume the burdens, risks,

6

The Tax Commission also observed that a sale of personal property to an exempt entity may be
subject to tax "if the exempt entity is simply acting as the purchasing agent for the general contractor."
(Conclusion of Law 14, Add. 14.) However, the Commission did not find that that situation existed in
this case.
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responsibilities and incidents of ownership of the materials being converted to real
However, that ruling is not supported
by the evidence or by the Commission's ownfindingsand analysis.
The Commission concluded, again without citation of authority, that for an exempt
organization to act as the prime contractor H ninsr

\) "\vIxerrise dirtvl supervision over

the construction project"; b) ff[i]ssue purchase orders to the vendors for all materials and
supplies foi v I: licl i tin : tax is nc t paid"; c) ft[m]ake direct payment to the vendors" for all
such materials; and d) "[h]ave provisions in any furnish and install contracts
changes through change orders to make that portion of the contract a labor only or install
only contract . . . ." (Conclusion P, A'M 16 I All "i thast, ttraditions were satisfied, as
documented in the Statement of Facts and supported by the Commission's own findings.
Alpine exercised direct supervision over the Project (Findings 7-9, 18-21, Add. 5, 7); Alpine
issued purchase orders and made direct payment for materials (Findings J, III, 16, 21, and
24, Add. 2-8); and change orders made the Subcontract an install only contract as to the
direct-iniich.isui iiiatnuls 11 Hidings K 16 <\dd in

The Commission then adds the

general condition that the exempt entity "must exercise sufficient direct supervision over
ilit" pui chased materials that there is a change in the legal status of which entity is
responsible for those materials." (Conclusion of Law IK, Ado 16-17 I Tins requirement
refers to the exempt entity's assumption of the burdens or incidents of ownership of the
materials. (Condusu •

" -

The Commission's findings that Alpine did not assume the burdens and incidents
of ownership of the materials (Findings 26-34, Add. 8-10) are contrary to the Commission's
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other findings. As documented in the Statement of Facts, Alpine ordered the materials,
paid for the materials, assumed the risks of price and quantity variances, assumed
responsibility to correct defects, took legal title to the materials, participated in inspection
of the materials upon delivery, insured the materials, and will assume the expense of the
tax if the assessment is upheld.

(Findings 4, 10, 14-17, 21-23, Add. 2-8.)

The

Commission's rationale cannot be supported by inconsistent findings. See, e.g., Boice v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 800 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Colo. App. 1990).
Certain of the Commission's findings with respect to Alpine's ownership of the
materials are simply contrary to the evidence. For example, Finding 26, that Alpine did
not participate in receipt or inspection of the materials, is presumably based on the
evidence that Paulsen and Brown inspected and approved the materials upon delivery.
(Tr. 77, 87-88.) However, that evidence does not negate the fact that Alpine's employees
also participated in, and had ultimate responsibility for, the inspection of materials. (Tr.
74-75.)

Finding 27, that Brown was responsible for defects in the direct-purchased

materials, is presumably based on the evidence that Brown helped to obtain replacement
of a defective boiler. (Finding 33, Add. 10; Tr. 89-90.) However, that evidence does not
alter the facts that Alpine also contacted the supplier of the boiler (Tr. 80, 92), that all
warranties ran to Alpine as owner (Finding 17, Add. 6), that Alpine was responsible for
all damage in transit (Tr. 143), and that the direct-purchase change orders relieved Brown
of responsibility for defects in the direct-purchased materials (Tr. 22-24, 41, 55, 61, 144,
154, 160). Finding 29, that the risks of ownership were on Brown, is apparently based on
the contract language in Finding 30 that the "contractor" would hold Alpine harmless for
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loss of or damage to the materials. However, here the Tax Commission confuses Paulsen
(the "contractor"), who did assume responsibility us inailtT i 1 (he materials -iltf delivery
(Findings 4g, 4h, 4k, 41, Add. 3), with Brown (the subcontractor), who assumed no such
responsibility (Ti 12, 'II,, 55-56) Alpiftf also "bore the risk of loss during storage through
its state insurance. (Finding 23, Add. 8.)
Thus,

Commission's conclusion that Brown, rather than Alpine, bore the

burdens of ownership of the materials is not suppi

tv tintli

d (he evidence.

The Commission's findings and conclusions to the contrary are conflicting and are based
s

he contract documents that were superseded or

amended by change order and the conduct of the parties. See Eie v, St Hent*dict\ Hosp.,
638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) (actions of parties to contract demonstrate intent and
will be enforced n n

1 unman in mniiai/i language). Moreover, Alpine had all the

important incidents of ownership to qualify as "prime contractor," and thus "consumer" of
tlit" materials, under tl ic Commission's analysis.
In summary, the Commission's artificial conditio*

^

« eive

its exemption are nowhere authorized in the law. Section 59-12-104(2) does not mention
that the exempi ciiiiiv iiiusi nisi lie (fit Vnnsmnu1

1 the materials or the "contractor"

on the building project. The "consumer" concept is relevant only to the taxing statute in
defining u V u i l 'sait

W-12-I03(l)(a); it has no relevance to the exemption statute.

Moreover, a school district should not have

; Mon

contracting in order to claim its lawful exemption. Even if the Commission's conditions
are applied, A Ipine's pi irehases qualify foi exemption because they were effected under

an install only contract, and Alpine retained all the significant aspects of ownership of the
materials.
Because there is no statutory, regulatory, or other legal basis for imposing a sales
tax on Brown for materials purchased directly by Alpine, the Tax Commission's Decision
and Order upholding the assessment must be reversed.
POINT H:

THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN ALTERNATIVELY IMPOSING A
USE TAX ON BROWN, AS SUBCONTRACTOR, FOR SCHOOL
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS PURCHASED IN UTAH BY ALPINE
AS A TAX-EXEMPT ENTITY.

As noted previously, the Tax Commission does not clearly state whether it is
imposing a sales tax or a use tax on Brown. The Notice of Deficiency refers to a "sales
tax deficiency." (Add. 26.) The attachment to the Notice refers to the assessment as a
"sales and use tax." (Add. 28.) The Answer to Petition for Redetermination refers to the
assessment merely as "the tax." (Add. 38.) The Tax Commission's first factual finding is:
'The tax in question is sales and use tax." (Add. 1.) The Conclusions of Law typically
refer to "sales and use tax." (£.g., Conclusions 1 and 2, Add. 10.) The Decision and
Order also refers to a unitary "sales and use tax." (E.g., p. 20, Add. 20.) But the final
page of the Decision and Order concludes that Brown is liable for a "use tax." (Add. 24.)
Apparently, the Tax Commission either is not sure whether the assessment is a sales tax
or a use tax, or it is simply trying to cover all bases and is asserting alternative grounds
for liability.

Whatever the Commission's intent, the law plainly does not support

imposition of a use tax in this case.
Section 59-12-103(l)(l) authorizes "a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or
charged for . . . tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state." (Add.
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142, i ni[i .njdnl i A ijiw usseil in iltMail. alnivt", with reference to a sales tax, any use tax
under this section could be assessed only on "the purchaser." Since Alpine, not fir m
urchaser of the materials in question, no use tax can be assessed to Brown. For
the same reason, Rule R865-19-58S, cited by the Commis.suHI m il v KIM.S (ui a use tax
(Decision and Order p. 24, Add. 24), provides no authority for assessment of a use tax
on Brown.
In any event, case law makes abundantly clear that a use tax may be imposed only
on goods purchased out-of-state for use in this state, and that property purchased in Utah,
which is not amenable to sales \n\ is likewise noi subject in UM lax

Far example, in

Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947),
ilit; ('ouri traced the history and purpose of the use tax and explained that its purpose was
to complement the sales tax by imposing a tax on the use ml prnpeih piuihast •

f-

state, beyond the reach of our sales tax, and brought into this state. Id., 176 P.2d at 88182. Because

sales tax, the Court held that a

transaction that is exempt from sales tax should also be exempt from use tax:
[I]t follows rather conclusively that the Sales and Use Tax Acts are to be
considered as correlative and complementary and that, as far as exemptions
are concerned, legislative created specific exemptions from the sales tax are
also to be treated as exemptions from the use tax. [Id. at 881.]
f law was subsequently confirmed in Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949), which, hrkl i kit iihc use tax applies to
the "storage, use or other consumption of property purchased outside of this state and
broughi niio Hi

iiti I ui storage, use or other consumption." Id., 209 P.2d at 211, emp.

added. The use tax has no application to property pi irehased i i iihitt this state:
.

m29m

We hold therefore, that the storage, use or other consumption of
property, the sale of which is made in this state and which is not made
amenable to the sales tax, is likewise not subject to the use tax. [Id., emp.
added.]
See also Barrett Investment Co. v. State Tax Commission, 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998, 999
(1964) (sales and use taxes are complementary so that transaction exempt under one is
also exempt under the other); Nevada Tax Commission v. Harker & Harker, Inc., 699 P.2d
112, 114 (Nev. 1985) (denied use tax on government contractor for materials used in
performing government contracts because contractor was not owner of materials).
Applying the foregoing rules to this case, it is evident that Brown cannot be
assessed a use tax. First, Alpine, not Brown, was the purchaser of the materials. Second,
Alpine indisputably purchased the subject materials in Utah, and the use tax has no
application to in-state sales. And third, because Alpine's purchases are exempt from the
sales tax, as demonstrated in Point I, above, they are also exempt from the use tax. The
Tax Commission may not defeat a statutory exemption from sales tax by simply imposing
a use tax. E.g., Union Portland Cement, supra, at 882.
In summary, there is no legal basis for imposition of a use tax on Brown for
installing materials purchased in Utah by Alpine as a tax-exempt entity. Accordingly, the
Tax Commission's decision must be reversed.
POINT ffl: THE TAX COMMISSION VIOLATED STATE STATUTE AND THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION BY IMPOSING AN EFFECTUAL TAX ON
ALPINE AS A TAX-EXEMPT ENTITY.
The tax-exemption for state entities in 59-12-104(2) states:
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this
chapter:
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(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political
subdivisions. [Add- 144.]
Representlivris itf b (h Hi wn .niil Alpine testified that the tax assessed to Brown for
materials purchased by Alpine will be paid by Alpine.7 According!), the ia> \ in (ft * he
foregoing exemption provision.
The separation of powei s pi o\ isioi :i ::>f tl i s • I Jtah Constitution, Article V, § 1,
precludes one branch of state government from exercising, or interfering with the exercise
ml, pov..ri;s delegate J I niHither branch:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted. [Add. 151.]

7

Lee Brown testified:
CJ II this commission eventually decides that Brown Plumbing & Heating is
responsible for the sales tax . . . for which you have been assessed, do you have an
understanding as to who will ultimately be responsible to pay that tax?
A I would expect the owner to pay that.
Q Why would you have that expectation,?
A
[Tr. 34.]

Because through the general contractor he deducted that from my contract.

Alpine's accountant testified similarly:

Q Do you have an understanding of who will be ultimately responsible for the tax on
this matter if Brown Plumbing is deemed to be responsible for the tax here?
A . . . [M]y understanding was that the agreement at the time if sales tax had to be patl
the district would then relieve Mr. Brown of that and take care of that [Tr. 122 ]

The Legislature possesses the exclusive power to levy taxes, including the sales tax, and
to appropriate revenues for operation of state government, including public education.
Utah Const.: Art. VI, § 1; Art. X, §§ 1 and 5; Art. XIII, § 12 (Add. 152-58). The Tax
Commission, an executive body, has only the authority to administer the tax laws as
authorized by the Legislature; it has no authority to control who must pay the tax or how
tax revenues will be apportioned. Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 11 (Add. 156-57). See, e.g.,
Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526, 528
(1935) (fThe imposition of a tax and the designation of those who must pay the same is
such an essential legislative function as may not be transferred to others."); Tite v. State
Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734, 740-41 (1936) (Commission's determination
of tax penalty violated separation of powers).
The Commission's imposition of a tax on Brown for materials purchased by Alpine
results in an encroachment by the Commission into the exclusive taxing and appropriation
powers of the Legislature. The assessment results in an unlawful tax on Alpine, an
exempt entity, thereby defeating the Legislature's designation of who shall and shall not
be taxed. If school districts are required to pay sales tax on all materials used in the
construction of school buildings, either directly or through higher bids to contractors who
must pay the tax, the districts will have to increase their construction budgets, and a
significant percentage of those funds will be diverted through the sales tax back into the
general fund for reallocation to noneducational uses. The tax thereby interferes with the
Legislature's exclusive appropriation power and defeats the legislative intent to maximize
education funding.
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This diversity of liiviils ii'oni education violates not only the separation of powers,
but Article XIII, § 12(3) as well, which requires all revenue received from income taxes
ulocated to the support of the public school system. See U.GA. § 53A-16-101.
*A* summary, the Tax Commission's decisis

nuisi "H iT\n\a1 .i< violative of

Alpine's statutory exemption and constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers
and education funding.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the decision of the Tax
Commission and order that Alpine's purchases of school construction materials are taxexempt.
I )A1 \ i • ihis /;;:^cJay of August, 1992.
Respectfully submitted,
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